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Introduction
The process of construction of the modern Spanish state 
and the articulation of Catalonia’s historical formation 
have been and continue to be essential issues in the Cata-
lan and Spanish historiographic debate.
In this article, we shall limit ourselves to summarily ex-
amining one phase in this long development, namely the 
period that signalled the transition from an aggregative, 
institutionally plural monarchy to another territorial 
form which, in the wake of the Bourbon victory in the 
War of the Spanish Succession, consolidated a central 
space – Spain – that was much more unified and charac-
terised by absolutist and centralising forms of govern-
ment with Castilian roots.1
It should immediately be noted that this kind of pro-
cess of political “union” based on a “composite monar-
chy”, “segmented state” or “dynastic agglomeration” was 
not exclusive to Spain; rather it was fairly common in Eu-
rope in modern times.2 However, we should also add that 
these processes had quite different means and results in 
terms of both the constitutive model of state and its terri-
torial organisation. These means were even more varied 
and nuanced if we bear in mind the evolution in such im-
portant social, cultural and identity features as religion, 
private law and language.3
With regard to the process of “union” in Spain in par-
ticular, it should be noted that a nationalistic geopolitical 
deterministic historiographic discourse has prevailed for 
many years. According to this vision, the construction of 
a state entity linked to the Spanish “nation” was the only 
possible option for the trajectory of the different histori-
cal formations on Spain; this viewpoint also argues that 
the modernising pathway necessarily entailed the con-
struction of a centralised, unified state. In the logic of this 
interpretation, the institutional pluralism of the Haps-
burg monarchy would be a mediaevalising form of state, 
the reason behind the Spanish crisis in the 17th century 
during which Portugal was “lost”. This theoretical con-
struct, which obviously has a strong political and ideolog-
ical bias, was first elaborated by the intelligentsia of the 
Castilian court in the 16th and 17th centuries and more 
recently upheld by historians with a wide range of ideolo-
gies. Indeed, Falangists, monarchists, historians linked to 
a Marxist or Marxistising history, a good number of 
Basque and Catalan historians and some Hispanists have 
also partaken of this interpretation.4
Given that the unifying model of the Castilian court 
coexisted with the model of the Crown of Aragon in the 
early centuries of modernity, one of the fundamental pur-
poses of this Spanish deterministic discourse was to dis-
credit or distort the “confederal” and “constitutional” 
model of state of the Crown of Aragon and Catalonia, 
something which has been attempted from each of the 
territories linked to this model.
Specifically, the aims in the Spanish nationalist dis-
course to discredit Catalonia’s model stand upon three 
basic strands of argumentation. The first is the contrast 
between the modernising, rationalising qualities and eco-
nomic efficacy of the unitarist, centralising route, com-
pared to the delayed and “mediaevalising” constitutional-
ist and confederal model. The second is the criticism of 
this model for being a feudal, oligarchic and corrupt sys-
tem. And finally, this Spanish nationalist historiographic 
discourse has striven to minimise or conceal the fact that 
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it was forcibly imposed, along with the historical resist-
ances it has generated.
Many of the premises upon which this Spanish deter-
ministic discourse is based may simply be questioned 
through a Europe-wide comparative historical exercise. 
The cases of England, Sweden, Holland and the Helvetic 
Union demonstrate that “old constitutionalism”, in the 
famous expression coined by Charles H. MacIlwain,5 
evolved from forms based on shared sovereignty towards 
republican models or models of parliamentary monar-
chy, and finally to liberal democratic regimes through 
longer or shorter transitional periods.6 In economics, for 
example, as demonstrated by comparing the history of 
France and England during the 18th century, by making 
political contracts more reliable, the representative and 
parliamentary systems paved the way for much more 
modern economic relations and lower bank interest rates, 
which offered better conditions for economic growth.7 
European historiography in recent decades has also re-
vealed the political role of parliamentary assemblies in the 
Middle Ages and modern centuries, stressing their values 
of representativeness and defence of much more horizon-
tal interests than those held by monarchies with absolutist 
leanings, which adopt much more pyramidal and oligar-
chic forms of government.8
What is more, the results of the Catalan historiographic 
research which has examined this historical period in re-
cent years have directly and severely questioned the as-
sumptions of Spanish nationalist determinism. Thus, nu-
merous studies have revealed the evolutionary capacity of 
the institutions in the Catalan pactist system in both theory 
and political practice.9 The heavy aristocratisation of mu-
nicipal governments after the Nueva Planta Decree has ap-
parently been demonstrated, which in turn marginalised 
the urban mesocracies that had traditionally been repre-
sented.10 In the realm of economic history, today we know 
conclusively that the economic upswing of the late Modern 
Age did not stem from the Bourbon administrative reforms 
but from the specialisation and intensification of agricul-
ture and manufacturing, as well as from the ties that Cata-
lan trade had forged with the major circuits of world trade. 
All of these processes had gotten underway before the ar-
rival of the Bourbons.11 Likewise, several studies have 
shown the high degree of violence and repression used to 
impose the Spanish unifying model manu militari.12 Most 
of these studies have simply been ignored by Spanish na-
tionalist historiography, which is why we believe that the 
interpretative synthesis offered in this article is not a stretch 
in its attempt to analyse several key issues in the process of 
constructing the modern Spanish state during this period.
Two divergent models of state: 
Absolutism and constitutionalism
Absolutism and constitutionalism have become two 
“strong” historiographic concepts in defining trends in 
Western political thinking in the early Modern Age. 
However, we should bear in mind that these concepts are 
neologisms coined in the 18th century and that they are 
far from being – in both theory and in the practice of gov-
ernment – contrasting or incompatible systems, as it 
might seem from the subsequent simplification and use of 
them. Absolutism and constitutionalism were two 
branchings from the same trunk – the regimen of res pub-
lica – which also had many other branches and interme-
diate “accents”.
Specifically, with regard to Spanish political thinking 
during the reign of the Hapsburgs, the classic dichotomy 
between Catalan-Aragonese constitutionalism and Cas-
tilian absolutism has been further nuanced and enriched. 
Since the 1980s, a series of historians has noted the exist-
ence of a constitutionalist current linked to changes in the 
tax system which were introduced in the Crown of Castile 
late in the reign of Philip II; this Castilian constitutional-
ist thinking emerged among the urban oligarchies and 
connected with the spirit of reform and regeneration in a 
society and economy that had fallen into a grave crisis.13 
However, this is not incompatible with the fact that 
among the Castilian governing class linked to the central 
administration of the monarchy – especially among the 
intelligentsia at court – ideals with absolutist and uni-
formising tendencies took root that would dovetail with 
the authoritarian principles of monarchic power already 
developed in the Castile governed by the Trastàmara dy-
nasty but that were now renewed and strengthened by the 
modern influences of Machiavelli, Lips and especially Bo-
din.14
The thesis of sovereignty put forth by Jean Bodin and 
other theoreticians of absolute monarchy only sparked 
arguments to reinforce the legitimacy of a royal power 
with absolutist tendencies which had a longstanding doc-
trinal tradition in Castile that can be dated back to the 
reign of Alphonse X. After all, despite the existence of po-
litical and legal thinking that was critical – or relatively 
critical – of the idea that the monarch was above positive 
law and that he could therefore legislate and grant privi-
leges at will, the comunis opinio of the doctrine of Castil-
ian policy in the late Modern Age was that the sovereign 
was only limited by divine law, natural law and the law of 
nations.15
In short, in Castile, and more precisely in the monar-
chy’s spheres of central power, authoritarian and absolut-
ist trends would end up being imposed in both theory and 
political practice. This would also have repercussions on 
the monarchy as a whole, given that if institutional diver-
sity is viewed as a source of weakness, respect for the 
forms of government local to each kingdom or province 
would be questioned16 and attempts would be made to in-
troduce the political underpinnings of Castilian law 
there.17
However, the interplay of balances and imbalances be-
tween king and kingdom would follow quite different 
evolutions in modern times in the different kingdoms 
001-186 Catala Historical Review 7.indd   46 09/07/2014   8:22:12
Catalonia in the process of constructing the modern Spanish state (16th-18th centuries): An interpretative approach  Cat. Hist. Rev. 7, 2014   47
and provinces that made up the composite monarchies. 
Thus, the political and ideological principles of Catalan-
Aragonese pactism evolved in a direction completely dif-
ferent to the theorisations of the Castilian court. In 
Aragon and Catalonia, especially after the late decades of 
the 16th century, the legalist formulations of the legal 
consultants found new elements in the historic discourse 
to invigorate contractualist approaches. Specifically, the 
myth of the furs (codes of law) of Sobrarb and a new story 
on the Carolingian origins of Catalonia enabled them to 
build ideological and juridical elaborations that would 
provide arguments and political fuel to the movements of 
1591 and 1640.18
In Catalonia, as is known, the thesis of corporate sover-
eignty had been assimilated back in the 13th century, and 
in the Late Middle Ages, jurists like Jaume Callís dissemi-
nated the idea of the res publica as a “mystical body” 
which placed the prince at the helm and his vassals as the 
members.19 This corporativist discourse, however, em-
bodied a tension between the two poles of legitimacy 
(king and community), a tension that was reflected in the 
heated controversy over the conception and nature of the 
assembly representing the community, the Courts.
This pactist or contractualist conception of power, 
which can be summarised in the formula “king and par-
liament”, gained an important theoretical alternative af-
ter the late 16th century. According to the increasingly 
clear perception of the strength of corporate assemblies 
and, in short, political communities in many parts of Eu-
rope, especially in England,20 in Catalonia a new concep-
tion of corporate sovereignty was also introduced which 
can be summarised in the formula “rex in curiae”, which 
is equivalent to the English “King in Parliament”. Accord-
ing to this theorisation, the king was encompassed by a 
body from which he could not be distinguished and in 
which his power was subsumed. This formula, which in 
turn allowed for a variety of interpretations (more or less 
restrictive with regard to royal power), can be noted in 
Catalonia in the works of Antoni Oliba, Andreu Bosc and 
especially Joan Pere Fontanella. The latter, drawing inspi-
ration from the Aragonese jurist Pedro Luis Martínez, as 
well as from Francisco Suárez, stated that the supreme 
power did not fall in the king’s hands but in the king along 
with the branches or estates.21
However, on the threshold in the Revolution of 1640, 
the issue of the locus of sovereignty would develop an 
even more ground-breaking proposition: the thesis of 
original popular sovereignty, which would place the Cat-
alan community, not the prince nor the community-
prince binomial, at the legitimising core of sovereignty. 
The populist theory of the source of the state’s power 
which had originally been formulated by authors like 
Francesc Eiximenis back in late mediaeval political think-
ing mainly reached Catalonia in the 17th century through 
the iusnaturalist populism from the 16th century Castil-
ian scholasticists such as the Jesuit Francisco Suárez. They 
envisioned the state as a natural community that emerged 
from the social impetus of a collective that transferred 
power in order to fulfil its needs for defence and protec-
tion, while reserving freedom and sovereignty for itself.22
The principle that sovereignty naturally belonged to 
the community and that it could never abdicate this sov-
ereignty was put forth by authors like Joan Pere Fonta-
nella, Francesc Martí Viladamor and Acaci Ripoll in the 
legal-political treatises of the 1630s and 1640s. On the eve 
of 1640, the representative and parliamentary political 
principles (as well as the concept of popular sovereignty, 
the idea of an elective monarchy and the right of resist-
ance) were rather deeply rooted in the Catalan body poli-
tic, and latent within them was the option of a parliamen-
tary monarchy or even a fully republican option.23
In addition to the topic of the locus of sovereignty, the 
other key question in Catalan political thinking in the 
early Modern Age was the definition of the political com-
munity or the type of territorial state. However, we should 
recall that this topic was particularly complex given the 
“composite” or “segmented” nature of the majority of po-
litical formations in mediaeval and Renaissance Europe.
Generally speaking, the constitutionalist avenue of 
thought advocated a territorial model of state that recog-
nised the institutional diversity of the historical forma-
tions that comprised it, while in the majority of cases the 
Figure 1. Compilation of the legislation agreed to by the Courts of 
Catalonia until the laws enacted in 1634. 1704 edition.
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absolutist and pro-uniformity tendencies were tamped 
down, since institutional diversity was interpreted as an 
obstacle to the strengthening of royal power.
It should be noted that there is no dearth of exceptions 
to this rule. Thus, a supporter of placing limits on monar-
chic power, Juan de Mariana, who even advocated tyran-
nicide, was, in contrast, a supporter of Spanish institu-
tional unity.24 Likewise, we can find several theoreticians 
from the Crown of Aragon who upheld moderate region-
alism (such as the Valencians Cristòfor Crespí de Vall-
daura and Llorenç Mateu i Sanz) while at the same time 
defending the local codes of law, privileges and institu-
tions of each kingdom.25
Early modern Catalan political thinking advocated, 
with only a handful of exceptions, even among the most 
royalist authors,26 an institutionally plural model of state. 
However, it should be noted that the mixture of the con-
stitutional model of the exercise of power (which stipu-
lated control of executive power according to representa-
tive assemblies) and the “confederal” model of the 
definition of state created ambiguities and problems that 
were not always thoroughly addressed or resolved in the 
constitutionalist theorisations.
There were essentially two problems: a) How to define 
– especially in view of international policy – an executive 
power shared by quasi-independent historical formations 
and at the same time by distinct geopolitical, economic 
and other interests, and b) how to adapt this model of 
state to growth through new territorial acquisitions from 
either marital ties or conquest. The case of the Spanish 
monarchy, which joined the Crowns of Aragon and Cas-
tile, the Portuguese empire and other territories, may be 
paradigmatic of this issue. The response to these ques-
tions in terms of political theory was the development of 
representative federal bodies (Courts of the monarchy 
and a kind of “council of councils”), which Diego Saave-
dra y Fajardo noted in the mid-17th century and which 
the Aragonese exiled Austriacist Juan Amor de Soria the-
orised more fully in the 18th century.27
Centre and periphery: The escalation of 
constitutional tensions
The inclusion of the Catalan historical formation with 
mediaeval roots in a large “composite monarchy”, namely 
the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy, poses a historical dia-
lectic between political “centre” and “periphery”, which, 
far from being particular or exceptional, was rather com-
mon in Europe during the early centuries of modernity.28
It should first be noted that this relationship cannot 
only be conceived in terms of confrontation or political 
subordination, or simply based on the existence of a di-
chotomy between two compact poles of power: court and 
country. Yet nor should we forget the dynamic, not static, 
nature of the dialectic between the centre of the Spanish 
monarchy, the Castilian Court, and Catalonia, since this 
relationship went through a wide variety of circumstanc-
es in terms of the evolution in the human and material 
forces, the ideological elaborations, the social balances 
and imbalances and the international political contexts. 
Finally, we should also note that the political dialectic of 
the kingdoms and provinces on the periphery arose not 
only with the central government of the monarchy; rather 
especially in border provinces like Catalonia, there were 
also interrelations between them and neighbouring pow-
ers, France in this case.
However, these considerations do not belie the idea 
that there was almost permanent constitutional tension 
between centre and periphery given that their divergent 
conceptualisations on the model of state, as outlined 
above, would clash in political practice both when estab-
lishing the scope and limits of the jurisdiction of monar-
chic power and when defining and carrying out directives 
aimed at constructing a territorial state capable of being 
consolidated and conserved through the agitated, divided 
Europe of the early centuries of modernity.
The latest studies on the 16th century in Catalonia are 
making it increasingly clear that the political-constitu-
tional edifice built since the late 15th-century reign of 
Ferdinand the Catholic soon revealed itself to be too frag-
ile and precarious to ensure a correspondence or collabo-
ration between the Catalans and the Crown. Back in the 
reign of Charles I and in the early years of Phillip II, the 
constitutional tensions blossomed in a variety of spheres. 
The institutional conflicts motivated by the royal officials’ 
Figure 2. Monument to the jurist and politician Joan-Pere Fonta-
nella (Olot, 1575 - Perpignan, 1649) in Olot, the city of his birth. It 
is the work of sculptor Miquel Blai.
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violations of the constitution and the inoperativeness of 
the constitution of “Observança” approved in the Courts 
of Barcelona of 1480-1481 were coupled with jurisdic-
tional clashes with the Tribunal of the Inquisition and the 
violence stemming from the presence of Spanish soldiers 
in the Principality. Likewise, since the 1420s, imperial 
policy in the Mediterranean had been seriously thwarting 
Catalan mercantile interests.29
This constitutional conflict would continue in the sec-
ond half of the 16th century with two remarkable mile-
stones: the confrontation between the Generalitat and the 
Crown in 1568-1569, which led to the imprisonment of 
deputies for having refused to contribute to paying the 
“excusat”,30 and especially the disturbances during the 
period 1587-1593. These latter events have been inter-
preted by the most recent Catalan historiography as a key 
juncture in the “political fracture” between Catalonia and 
the Hapsburg dynasty, which would place the relations 
between king and kingdom on the road towards the Rev-
olution of 1640.31
The episodes of upheaval in 1587-1593 had major po-
litical and legal implications, since they entailed question-
ing the pre-eminence of royal jurisdiction in Catalonia 
and served as the catalyst for other constitutional disputes 
on the king’s potestas iuriscendi which would be put into 
place until the Revolution of 1640. Based on chapters 7 
and 34 of the government’s new reform approved by the 
Courts of 1585, the interpretation was made that the di-
vuitenes32 not only were charged with declaring violations 
of the constitutions but also had the authority to make le-
gal annotations and issue the corresponding sanctions, 
bypassing the authority of the Audience (the highest 
court in Catalonia). To the Council of Aragon, the vice-
roys and the Audience, the proceedings regarding the vi-
olations of the constitutions undertaken by the divuitenes 
cast doubt on royal authority in the Principality and could 
even be considered a crime of lèse-majesté. In contrast, to 
the defenders of the laws and institutions of the land, they 
were the constitutional mechanism which was meant to 
ensure the regime’s compliance with the constitutions on 
which the Catalan political community was grounded, 
given the inoperativeness of the constitution of “Obser-
vança”.
During that period, the Catalan Diputació, traditional-
ly made up of three deputies, one from each branch 
(Church, military or nobility, and royal or urban), and so-
cially bolstered by the Juntes de Braços (boards of mem-
bers from all three branches) and the divuitenes created 
by virtue of the nou redreç (new reform) of the Courts of 
1585, entered a spiral of confrontations with the institu-
tions representing royal power in Catalonia, especially 
with the third court of the Audience. These clashes culmi-
nated in May 1591, when the viceroyal guard tried to cap-
ture the military (i.e., noble) deputy, Joan Granollacs, an 
attempt that failed due to the deputy’s resistance and the 
grassroots support he received. Granollacs and the sup-
porters of confronting the abuses of royal jurisdiction 
closed the Palau de la Generalitat for almost eleven 
months. However, ultimately, the fear that the events in 
Catalonia might end through the same military might 
that Philip II had wielded in the altercations in Aragon – 
which led to the execution of the Aragonese justice Juan 
de Lanuza, among other actions – dissolved the resistance 
from the Catalan institutions. On the 22nd of February 
1593, the Catalan institutions were notified of the suspen-
sion of chapters 7, 13 and 34 of the nou redreç from the 
Courts of 1585. This laws issued by the king and the 
branches was unilaterally suspended via a Royal Pragmat-
ic. However, there was repression in the guise of legal pro-
ceedings against the people associated with the Diputació 
and the divuitenes, some of whom, such as the military 
deputy Joan Granollacs, would choose the pathway of ex-
ile to avoid arrest.
Thus, at least after the Courts of 1595, a heated juris-
dictional conflict was unleashed in which the king be-
lieved that the actions of the Catalan institutions usurped 
different facets of royal jurisdiction, while the leaders of 
the institutions in the Principality believed that the 
Crown’s actions contravened the constitutions and laws 
agreed to between king and kingdom, which were the 
higher underpinning of the Catalan res publica, as explic-
itly stated in the royal oath.33 Far from interpreting each 
other as complementary forces with common interests 
and reciprocal correspondences, each saw the other as a 
hindrance or obstacle to their ideals and interests.
The rapprochement of the Courts of 1599, in which the 
flood of noble appointments by the king was answered by 
the granting of a donation of 1,100,000 pounds, was a 
fleeting mirage. The ministry of the Duke of Lerma’s in-
tention was that five constitutions should appear in the 
legislative corpus that was to be printed from the sessions 
of the Courts. These constitutions were questioned by the 
Generalitat and the military branch, which unleashed yet 
another bitter institutional and legal dispute that led to 
the imprisonment of the military deputy and auditor.34
In the opinion of John H. Elliott, one of the fundamen-
tal keys to explaining the clash between the Catalan insti-
tutions and the central government of the Spanish mon-
archy in the decades prior to the Revolution of 1640 was 
the difficulty of combining respect for the “legality” of the 
constitutions with the “needs” arising from political prac-
tice. In the early decades of the 17th century, the clearest 
expression of this contradiction was the issue of the re-
pression of banditry. According to Elliott, the viceroyal-
ties of the Dukes of Alburquerque and Alcalá (1615-1621) 
were a time of the “restoration of government” given that 
the stringent, anti-constitutional methods of these Castil-
ian viceroys – including the large-scale razing of homes 
and castles – along with the urbanisation of the nobility, 
had been a key factor in the “domestication” of the Cata-
lan aristocracy, distancing it from the feudal-style private 
wars.35
To what extent was the disorder and violence that Cata-
lonia experienced in around 1615 the result of a system of 
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laws and constitutions at the “service” of a feudal oligar-
chy? The English historian’s answer is rather conclusive 
on this issue: “The much-vaunted freedoms of the Princi-
pality, far from being a guarantee of political freedom and 
the social order, had become an invitation to license”.36
Unquestionably, inasmuch as certain rights or privi-
leges, such as the right to bear arms or the recourse to vio-
lence as a means of exercising certain seigniorial preroga-
tives, were part of the laws and constitutions of Catalonia, 
there could be a mixture or superimposition of the exer-
cise of aristocratic privileges and an abuse of the freedoms 
of the “land”. However, I believe it would be risky to at-
tribute all the political and social upheaval – in which cer-
tain bandit lords were unquestionably involved – to a spe-
cific social class, and even more erroneous to relate it to 
the system of laws and constitutions of the country, 
which, lest we forget it, included a much broader swath of 
society than just the noble class.
This is because, though it is true that the constitutions 
of Catalonia may have been an instrument to safeguard 
certain private or estate interests, it is equally true that 
they upheld many general and community interests which 
were often trampled upon by the same royal officials who 
were fighting the bandit lords. The attacks on the commu-
nities that destabilised the social order could just as easily 
have come from the violence exercised by the bandit lords 
as by the violence waged by the king’s troops and officials, 
and we should also add that the tensions caused by the 
viceroys’ actions not only stemmed from the repression of 
banditry or the Castilian Spanish state’s mechanisms of 
extortion but also from certain attempts to politically and 
nationally pervert the Catalan community.37
Likewise, as Eva Serra has noted, the Catalan petty aris-
tocracy’s conflict with the Crown was motivated not only 
by the criminalisation of the ban on the noble estate but 
also by the displacement or neglect of its leading role in 
political life. The viceroys’ repeated violations of the con-
stitutional laws were, among other things, an attack on 
the political order of the Catalan community, in which 
the military (nobility) was given a prominent public func-
tion.38
In the constitutional conflict of 1621-1622 over the 
oath of Philip IV, the rancour that had been gathering for 
years among Catalonia’s petty aristocracy finally sur-
faced, as their pride as a leading class had been injured, 
especially during the viceroyalties of Alburquerque and 
Alcalá. The offensive from the institutions of the country, 
which claimed that Lieutenants Alcalá and Sentís could 
not act in their posts until the new monarch swore to ob-
serve the privileges and constitutions of the Principality, 
unleashed major institutional tensions that were accom-
panied by a sweeping constitutional debate that has been 
compared to the one that took place in the kingdom of 
Bohemia in 1619, when its estates deposed Ferdinand II 
and chose the Palatine elector Frederick in his place.39
Clearly, a mixture of the defence of particular class in-
terests and general ideals regarding the desire to move to-
wards a pactist model of state can explain both the up-
heaval of 1621-1622 and the Catalan ruling class’s 
steadfast resistance to the absolutist reformism advocated 
by the ministry of Olivares, which became clear in the 
failure of the Courts of 1626-1632.40
We should also note that the economic differences that 
may have existed between the king and the Catalan 
branches on the question of donations were only a reflec-
tion of a much deeper political and constitutional diver-
gence. In the Courts sessions of 1626-1632, the gap sepa-
rating the absolutist reformism of the ministry of 
Count-Duke Olivares and the renewed Catalan constitu-
tionalism became clear in terms of the reforms of the con-
stitution of the “Observança”, the attempts to scale back 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the Inquisition, the 
control of the quint of municipal taxes and the articula-
tion of the monarchy through the projection of the “Unió 
d’Armes” (a contingent of troops that was supposed to 
maintain Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon).
The failure of the Courts of 1626-1632 led two ideas on 
the political dynamic of the Principality to take root 
among the government circles of the monarchy. The first 
was that the constitutionalist bent of the Catalan institu-
tions, as well as the desire for self-government among 
Catalonia’s ruling class, were opposed to the basic princi-
ples that should prevail to ensure the monarchy’s sound 
governance. The second was that the political mecha-
nisms were already incapable of correcting or reconduct-
ing this situation, and that therefore to avoid greater evils, 
the combined use of force and politics must be imposed.
The strategy of calling the Courts accompanied by the 
presence of an army had been broadly debated in the 
boards and councils of the monarchy since 1632.41 To 
some government ministries, it was necessary to first 
“conquer” Catalonia and then call the Courts, as Philip II 
had done with the Aragonese, while to others, the intimi-
dating presence of an army would be enough to ensure 
the Catalan branches’ submission to royal will. However, 
a detailed examination of these deliberations reveals that 
there was widespread consensus among the Court minis-
ters on the need for the combined use of force and politics 
to modify the constitutional balance inherited from the 
dynastic union of the Catholic Kings. The discrepancies 
only lay in whether or not to do it at a time when this in-
ternal constitutional problem might be mixed with the 
overarching conflict over European hegemony that the 
Spanish and French powers were facing. And as is known, 
this was the strategy ultimately chosen by the ministry of 
Count-Duke Olivares to put an end to what was consid-
ered a rebellion by the Catalans in the summer of 1640.
In short, the political theorisations with unitarist and 
absolutist tendencies that dominated at the heart of the 
Castilian court were accompanied by initiatives in the 
realm of political practice which advocated a combined 
use of force and politics. This, in our opinion, radically 
questions the line of interpretation which has recently up-
held the existence of a Spanish imperial ideology, sup-
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ported on the concept of a “monarchy of Spain” particu-
larly after the reign of Philip II, which would have the 
benefit of guaranteeing the freedoms and privileges of the 
territories in it.42
A ruling class distant from the throne
One of the decisive features of the political dialectic be-
tween Catalonia and the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy 
was the weakness of the Catalan ruling class’ adherence to 
the royal power. It should be noted that the most recent 
historiography on the formation of the modern state has 
stressed not only that was it difficult to govern against the 
provincial ruling classes but that it was also difficult to 
govern without their support.43
In the history of early modern Catalonia, one very im-
portant factor was that the two institutions at the helm of 
the political life of the Principality – the Consell de Cent 
(Council of One Hundred) and the Generalitat – had a 
shared social base of power: the new Barcelona-based rul-
ing class that had taken shape since the late 15th century. 
The urbanised petty nobility, honorary citizens, mer-
chants and canons of Barcelona, as well as some rising lib-
eral professionals, especially doctors and judges, made up 
a highly cohesive ruling class which at that time dominat-
ed both institutions and steered the fates of Barcelona and 
Catalonia as a whole.44 Even though at certain times the 
Crown intentionally strove to break this institutional alli-
ance, and there was no dearth of friction or jurisdictional 
competition between both institutions, there was gener-
ally shared alignment on the issues that affected the un-
derpinnings of the Catalan pactist regime.
This Barcelona-based ruling class was a “composite” 
elite. Its fundamental core was the urban patricians, the 
so-called honorary citizens, that is, citizens who were dis-
tinguished by their political and economic status, whose 
rank equalled that of the nobility through a privilege is-
sued by Ferdinand II in 1510. However, this Barcelona-
based ruling class was bolstered by the addition of mem-
bers from both the upper and lower echelons of the body 
politic. First, it included members of the traditional Cata-
lan nobility – nobles and knights – who had been involved 
in an intense process of urbanisation since the late 15th 
century. James Amelang has discussed a “great compro-
mise” through which, between the 16th and early 17th 
centuries, there was an exchange of social status (the no-
bility facilitated the aristocratisation of the urban patri-
cians) for power (the honorary citizens allowed the nobil-
ity into politics and local government posts).45
However, the Barcelona-based ruling class also had in-
stitutional mechanisms in place that made it possible for 
individuals from the middle class to join it, especially 
merchants, jurists and doctors. The status of honorary 
citizen could be acquired either through the system of 
cooptation, which expanded the rolls of honorary citizens 
through assemblies held by the patricians every year, or 
by the citizenship patents granted by the monarch. In 
short, unlike other European urban oligarchies, the Bar-
celona elite was open, or at least relatively open.46
Even though there was no dearth of factional partisan-
ship, the Barcelona-based ruling class was highly cohesive 
through a constant dynamic of marriage ties among its 
members, as well as by its firm – though not exclusive – so-
cial control over the most important Catalan institutions 
and shared models of political education and culture. The 
inclusion of numerous family lineages of jurists, as well as 
the promotion of legal studies among the ranks of the no-
bility, contributed to strengthening and disseminating 
among these elites the values of the pactist political model 
which had secular roots in the production of Catalan law.47
The royal power orphaned this ruling class from “ser-
vice” and “reward”, as the weakness of royal patronage in 
Catalonia seems beyond dispute. J. H. Elliott noted the 
extraordinary precariousness of the posts that the vice-
royal administration made available to a ruling class 
which was comprised of around 780 people in around 
1626. According to this English historian: “It is doubtful 
whether the central administration had more than twelve 
posts for members of the aristocracy”, which, to make 
matters worse, were very poorly compensated economi-
cally.48 The weak status of the structure of the royal ad-
ministration in Catalonia bore a close relationship to the 
king’s scant tax and capital resources there. In the early 
17th century, the viceroyal administration’s annual reve-
nues were around 37,000 pounds, which were joined by 
the 10,000 more that the Diputació contributed to pay the 
judges and functionaries of the Royal Audience. Howev-
er, these figures were insufficient since the Crown had to 
supply 19,000 more pounds from the outside in order to 
meet the salaries of the viceroys (around 6,000 pounds) 
and to balance the budget.49
Outside of Catalonia, the Catalan ruling class’s pros-
pects for enjoying royal patronage were hardly better. Nei-
ther a military career nor a post in the civil administration 
of the central government of the monarchy was an easy, 
generous means of ascent for this Catalan ruling class. Nor 
were the encomiendas of the major military orders, which 
were theoretically open to all subjects of the King of Spain, 
a means of integration and compensation for the members 
of the Catalan ruling class. In the early 17th century, only 
17 of the 1,452 members of the Orders of Alcántara, Cala-
trava and Santiago were Catalonia natives, that is, less than 
one percent. As J. H. Elliott noted, “If there was a ‘Spanish’ 
aristocracy, the Catalans were not part of it”.50
However, the issue of patronage was really only a re-
flection of a much deeper political issue: the inability of 
the central government of the Spanish monarchy to es-
tablish acceptable levels of integration, communication 
and political consensus with the Catalan ruling class. The 
case of the France of Richelieu, Mazzarino and Colbert 
has been held up as an example of the efficacy of royal 
patronage – centralised, in this case – which succeeded in 
the objectives of achieving control over the provinces of 
001-186 Catala Historical Review 7.indd   51 09/07/2014   8:22:14
52   Cat. Hist. Rev. 7, 2014 Antoni Simon
the kingdom while also knitting solid ties between the 
monarchy and the numerous regional elites, thus 
strengthening the absolutist and centralising trends of the 
Bourbon monarchy.51
The Hapsburg monarchy never managed to forge min-
imally solid and socially widespread ties of patronage, 
communication and political influence in Catalonia. The 
attempts to build these ties via members of the Court like 
Pere de Franquesa and Salvador Fontanet never managed 
to achieve either solidity or continuity. However, the at-
tempts to articulate a pro-royal nucleus based on family 
clans located in the Principality, such as the Marimons, 
never managed to take hold either, nor did enlisting the 
services of the upper aristocracy, the Duke of Cardona, to 
attain the interests and designs of the Crown.52
The political marginalisation of the Catalan ruling class 
and the Crown’s loss of support in the Principality were 
the flip sides of the same coin. Yet this same period also 
witnessed a strengthening of the local institutions, which 
were primarily controlled by the ruling class. Especially 
after the second half of the 16th century, the Diputació del 
General and the Consell de Cent became more represent-
ative of the Catalan community and less representative of 
royal power. The strengthening of these institutions – ad-
ministratively, symbolically and in other spheres – as well 
as the Generalitat’s promotion of a tax and finance system 
enabled it to weave a web of interests and complicities 
around it that extended to broad swaths of Catalan socie-
ty.53 This process reinforced the sense of public responsi-
bility among the Catalan ruling class, making them aware 
of their steering role in the community of “Catalans” 
while also creating a hierarchy of loyalties in which the 
duty to the laws and institutions of the land would be in-
creasingly preeminent.
If we focus on the members of the ruling core in the 
Revolution of 1640, we can note these individuals’ strong 
ties with the local institutions. Many of them were mem-
bers of the military branch while also occupying posts in 
the Diputació and Consell de Cent in a continuous and/or 
intergenerational fashion. This contrasts with the volatile 
or spasmodic nature of their ties with the Crown. In fact, 
the “rupture” with royal power was common ground 
among many members of this leading core of the Revolu-
tion of 1640, since even though their grandparents or pro-
genitors had been members of the Royal Audience or the 
Council of Aragon, they were now at the spearhead of a 
process of rupture with the Spanish monarchy.54 Just as 
with Barcelona’s entire ruling class, and Catalonia’s ruling 
class in general, the elements of their political adherence 
with the Crown were inconsistent and lacked continuity.
The rupture of 1640
The military factor ultimately provided the fuse and spark 
that led the longstanding institutional and jurisdictional 
tensions to explode. After 1635, the French-Spanish 
struggle for hegemony in Europe turned Catalonia into 
the war front and parade grounds of the Catholic monar-
chy. Instead of getting the Catalans to adhere to the impe-
rial designs of Olivares and Philip IV, as many ministers 
at court wished, this only sparked new constitutional ten-
sions that derived from the irregular billeting of the 
troops, the illegal mobilisations of the local people and 
the tax burdens imposed beyond the constitutional limits. 
After the three-year period of 1638-1641, the Diputació, 
led by the Canon of Urgell, Pau Claris, started to publicly 
denounce the throngs and excesses brought about by the 
massive military presence in the villages and universities 
of the Principality and countships, which, though not un-
known in the past, was now extraordinary in its impact 
and magnitude.55
The political blindness of Olivares’ ministry, which was 
also pressuring the city of Barcelona with disproportion-
ate and unconstitutional tax demands, ended up leading 
the two most important Catalan institutions to join forces 
into a united front against royal policy. This convergence, 
which was highly visible after January-February 1639, 
would not be undone during that three-year period and 
would culminate with the revolutionary process of 1640-
1641, an institutional agreement through which Pau Cla-
ris would become the political leader of the Catalan ruling 
class.56
The French invasion of Roussillon in June 1639 first 
led to the fall of Salses and later to a long and costly cam-
paign to win back this fortress perched just over the bor-
Figure 3. Pau Claris i Casademunt (Barcelona, 1586-1641), 94th 
President of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Image from an engraving 
from the work Barcelona Ancient and Modern by Andreu Avel.lí Pi 
i Arimon, published in 1854.
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der.57 In the approximately seven months that this mili-
tary episode lasted, the relations between the institutions 
and royal power deteriorated extraordinarily, and by Jan-
uary 1640 Olivares’ ministry seemed to have forgotten all 
the norms of political caution in Catalonia. During the 
ensuing months, it pressured the peasants and lower class 
to billet the troops, which was not only exceedingly un-
constitutional but was also harrowing for villages which 
had already suffered greatly. Simultaneously, Olivares’ 
ministry also made a series of arrests, striving to decapi-
tate – at least politically – the Catalan leaders who had 
proven to be the most staunchly opposed to the central 
government’s directives.
The first reaction to this strategy was vehement social 
outcry. It was initially anti-military and anti-tax, but it 
soon took on the guise of a class conflict,58 and the reli-
gious tone that the protest soon adopted led it to gain mo-
mentum in society.59
However, the directives of Olivares’ ministry also 
prompted a political response which led the Catalan lead-
ers, using the force of the popular uprising, to release the 
military deputy Francesc Tamarit and other prisoners on 
the 22nd of May 1640. This episode was a milestone in 
the process of rupture between the Madrid government 
and the Catalan ruling class, a process that would ulti-
mately prove to be irreversible.60 Firstly, Olivares and the 
ministers of Court interpreted those deeds as an unequiv-
ocal sign of political rebellion, and thereafter they deter-
mined that military intervention was the best means of 
redressing the situation in Catalonia. Likewise, and this 
demonstrates that both sides were aware of the political 
significance of the episode, Pau Claris and Olivares im-
mediately embarked upon separate secret negotiations 
with France, Catalonia with the goal of exploring the pos-
sibility of securing French military aid should a bloody 
battle with the Court of Madrid ensue, and Spain, which 
contacted Richelieu, despite the war, to neutralise this 
potential scenario.61
The events that transpired on the day of “Corpus de 
Sang” (Bloody Corpus Christi, 7th of June), with the 
death of the viceroy-count of Santa Coloma and the per-
secution of the judges of the Audience, along with the oc-
currences in Perpignan between the 13th and 15th of the 
same month, with the bombardment, burning and pillag-
ing of the city by Spanish troops, only served to widen the 
abyss that opened in late May. With the aim of gaining 
time to prepare military intervention measures against 
Catalonia, the Court of Madrid implemented a policy of 
concealing its repressive intentions, although the Catalan 
leaders were not hoodwinked.62
This twofold game being played by the central govern-
ment of the monarchy even further hindered any political 
rapprochement between both sides, since, once the lead-
ers of the Principality became aware of it their conviction 
that the intentions of Olivares’ ministry were implacably 
repressive was only strengthened. Thereafter, while Ma-
drid viewed military control of the province as a neces-
sary requirement in order to restore justice and royal au-
thority, to the Catalan ruling classes being freed from 
military bondage was the only reliable guarantee of both 
safeguarding the people from the troops and guarantee-
ing the freedoms and constitutions of their own political 
system, as well as avoiding a kind of personal and institu-
tional repression which, to their minds, had already been 
decided upon in government circles.
In mid-August 1640, when the preparations for the 
army that was supposed to invade Catalonia were already 
well underway, Philip IV and Olivares publicised this de-
cision along with the monarch’s intention to travel to the 
Principality to hold Courts and “to restore the trampled 
justice”. Pau Claris’ political response was twofold and 
trenchant: first, he reactivated the negotiations with 
France in order to secure military aid, and secondly, using 
the same argument of restoring “trampled justice”, he 
called a meeting of the Junta General de Braços to legiti-
mise and organise the armed resistance to the invasion 
that had been publicly announced by the Court of Ma-
drid.
However, it should be noted that the first and most de-
sired option for the majority of Catalan leaders was not 
“separatist” and, in fact, they devised a strategy that in-
cluded trying to convince Philip IV to desist in his mili-
tary invasion of Catalonia (by striving to show an inflated 
military strength that would be reinforced by French mil-
itary aid). The best option in the minds of the Catalan 
leaders was to remain the vassals of the Catholic King 
while saving the land from the hordes of soldiers and en-
suring its political system of freedoms and constitutions. 
Once they were convinced that this would be impossible 
as long as Olivares and Jerónimo Villanueva were steer-
ing the Court’s affairs, they strove to unseat them with an 
intense letter- and report-writing campaign that culmi-
nated in the publication and dissemination of the Procla-
mación Católica commissioned to the skilled polemicist 
Gaspar Sala, which explicitly called for Olivares’ removal 
from office.63 However, the roots of the political and ideo-
logical directives issuing from the government circles 
(basically reinforcing royal authority and eliminating the 
roadblocks of any intermediate power in the governance 
of the monarchy) ran much deeper than what could be 
derived from the stance of some ministers, the reason this 
strategy failed.
When Pau Claris called the meeting of the Junta Gen-
eral de Braços on the 10th of September 1640, the Catalan 
revolutionary process actually got underway, and al-
though in political theory it did not take on an explicitly 
republican guise, since it simply rendered royal sovereign-
ty idle, in political practice, it did act as a fully sovereign 
power. Between the 10th of September 1640 and the 30th 
of December 1641 – the date when Louis XIII took his 
oath on the laws and constitutions of the Principality 
through Marshal Brezé – the institutional representatives 
of the Catalan branches appointed officials to impart jus-
tice and administer the land; they recruited and organised 
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a Catalan militia; they implemented and collected new 
taxes; they coined money; and they turned themselves 
over to the sovereignty of Louis XIII of France after having 
broken the bonds of loyalty that bound them to Philip VI.
In the initial impetus of this “republican moment”, Pau 
Claris focused on enlisting broad swaths of the Catalan 
body politic by notably expanding the urban and village 
mesocracies in the popular branch in the Junta General 
de Braços. To the leaders who had been at the helm of the 
revolutionary movement, this was both a means of por-
traying political strength to the Court of Madrid and a 
way of legitimising and binding most of the villages to the 
resistance against the royal armies.
Despite the efforts made by the Catalan institutions to 
organise a military force capable of handling the army al-
most 30,000 men strong commanded by the Marquis of 
Los Vélez which threatened to invade Catalonia from the 
line of Aragon and Valencia, this goal was impossible to 
reach. Setting up administrative, military and financial 
structures strong enough to sustain a large-scale war re-
quired time, not to mention levels of experience and ac-
cumulations of capital that were unavailable at that time. 
The Spanish army’s violent entrance into the lands of the 
Ebro River swiftly revealed both Catalonia’s military 
weakness and the aggressive and repressive aims guiding 
the Spanish intervention.64
The alliance with France and the liberating victory on 
Montjuïc (26th of January 1641) would destroy all of the 
ministry of Olivares’ political and military calculations, 
since now it was clear that the Catalans’ rebellion would 
not be easily snuffed out, while it also became clear that 
the army would be unable to reach the western side of the 
peninsula to put down the rebellion that had broken out 
in Portugal on the 1st of December 1640.
From 1640 to 1714: Wars and “national” 
shock. The Catalan constitutional 
controversy in the game of European 
international politics
The Catalan ruling class’s resistance to the absolutist re-
formism of the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares and 
Catalonia’s entry in the great arena of European interna-
tional politics after its 1640-1641 rupture with the Span-
ish monarchy had major repercussions on both the pro-
cess of constructing the modern Spanish state and the 
balance of international relations in 17th century Europe.
Internally in Spain, the Catalans’ rebellion destroyed 
the projects being devised by the intelligentsia at the Cas-
tilian Court since the late 16th century, which Olivares’ 
reformist policy of constructing the base of a Spanish 
state in the former Iberia that was institutionally compact 
and, at least in the long-term, had a unitary identity, was 
seeking to put into practice, at least partly. The long, 
bloody war to “win back” Catalonia from 1640-1652 laid a 
depth charge to the project of constructing the modern 
Spanish state, as it broke the bonds of political trust be-
tween the Castilian centre and the historical Catalan for-
mation. The perceptions of the causes and development 
of the process of rupture were different, yet they all led to 
a feeling of distance and mistrust. In Castile, and especial-
ly in the Castilian court, the Catalan and Portuguese re-
bellion rendered it impossible to establish that compact, 
well-built, cohesive state designed and run by Castile. In 
Catalonia, the Spanish unifying project dreamt up by the 
intelligentsia at court and tested by Olivares had revealed 
itself to be aggressive and unilateral, as it attacked the Cat-
alan political and national identity. What Olivares had 
advocated in his 1624 Gran memorial as an ideal or a ho-
rizon to attain among the king’s Spanish subjects – the 
rapprochement of their desires and feelings so that Spain 
could become a political and national community – was 
more of a pipe dream than ever.
Although it permeated the political and intellectual de-
bate at the time, the identity factor (with the interplay of 
Catalonia-Castile-Spain as the fundamental referents) 
was not what triggered the Revolt of Catalonia of 1640-
1652. However, once the hostilities had begun, the “na-
tional” factor took on extraordinary momentum and size. 
The experience of confrontation between “natives” and 
“invaders”, the spiral of violence and repression and the 
stimulus of feelings of hatred and separation through war 
propaganda and the moral and religious sanctions issued 
by the Church against the outside oppressors largely fed 
Catalan society with strong Catalan-Spanish and Catalan-
French counter-identities.65
In fact, a kind of concatenation or reaction had been 
unleashed that survived until the end of the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The political conceptualisation of 
Spain and the absolutist tendencies of the central govern-
ment nurtured unifying policies that came upon vigorous 
resistance in the Catalan political community, which had 
Figure 4. Cover of one of the propaganda books on the 1640 Cata-
lan uprising written by Friar Gaspar Sala.
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matured its own institutional, symbolic-identity and cul-
tural referents during that period. The Spanish military 
presence in the land sought to achieve the objectives and 
ideals of a faraway dynasty and a Castilianised political 
centre, but what it actually fostered was precisely a “na-
tional” shock that made any project aimed at identity uni-
fication even more unfeasible. 
Likewise, in international politics, the Catalans’ revolu-
tionary rupture in 1640-1641 weakened Spain’s positions 
in other spheres of conflict. The fact that the war to “win 
back” Catalonia was considered a priority for the Court of 
Madrid facilitated the victory of the Portuguese seces-
sionist coup while also diminishing the human and eco-
nomic resources assigned by the Spanish power to the 
Netherlands and Italy, thus contributing to the definitive 
ascent of France within European hegemony. This was 
enshrined by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, which 
also signalled the partition of Catalonia.
The “return” of Barcelona and most of Catalonia to the 
Spanish monarchy in October 1652 meant the Catalan 
institutions’ loss of self-governance. Even though the 
Court of Madrid considered more stringent repressive 
options, the continued threat from France meant that the 
central governing bodies of the monarchy chose to try to 
control the political life of the Principality by the royal 
reserve of the vote in the Generalitat and the Consell de 
Cent, an institutional measure which was combined with 
a greater Spanish military presence on Catalan soil.66 The 
leaders were periodically chosen based on a census that 
was called the Llibre de l’Ànima (literally “Book of Souls”, 
or book of potential public servants), and the king gave 
himself the right to exclude anyone who was considered 
disaffected.
With the royal reserve on the vote, the goal was to 
launch political mechanisms in which the key institutions 
in the Principality would be filled with personnel that 
were docile to the directives issued by the royal power 
through the mixture of “rewards” and “punishments”.67 
However, this would prove to be an unsuccessful means 
of politically subjugating the Principality. And, in fact, the 
royal reserve on the vote became a bone of contention 
which instead of getting the Catalan ruling class to adhere 
to the political will of the Court of Madrid aroused a spi-
ral of unsatisfied claims and institutional clashes. The as-
pirations to recover the self-governance lost after the 
Guerra dels Segadors (Reapers’ War, or Catalan Revolt) 
were never abandoned by institutional leaders who had 
theoretically been “chosen” or “screened” by the royal 
power but who would, in fact, become the core of the po-
litical claims that linked 1652 to 1705.68
Even though Barcelona’s ruling class, and Catalonia’s 
in general, had suffered from the divisions and ravages of 
the Spanish monarchy in the years since the War of the 
Spanish Succession, and despite the fact that this negative 
experience shaped its subsequent political attitude, this 
ruling class never abandoned a pactist culture with the 
self-governance of the Generalitat and the Consell de 
Cent at its core. Likewise, as this ruling class was relatively 
socially open and had the ability to integrate the most dy-
namic sectors from Catalan society, the claims for self-
governance attained widespread support and were not 
foreign to the groups who spearheaded the economic 
transformations in the Principality in the second half of 
the 17th century.69
The institutions’ desire to win back self-governance is 
the key to understanding Catalonia’s support of the Haps-
burgs in the War of the Spanish Succession. While in 1640 
Catalonia’s involvement in the game of European inter-
national politics had come about in an attempt to stop the 
attacks of Olivares’ absolutist reformism, in 1705 it 
stemmed from the attempt to recover the self-governance 
lost since 1652. In this sense, Catalonia’s 1705 stance had 
not a “Spanish” horizon, as the bulk of Catalan historiog-
raphy has upheld since Ferran Soldevila (Vicens Vives, 
Pierre Vilar, Joaquim Albareda, Josep M. Torras i Ribé 
and Josep Fontana, among others) but a Catalan “sover-
eignist” horizon. The purpose of Catalonia’s 1705 stance 
was to strengthen the freedoms of the pactist system, 
which had been curtailed since 1652 and constantly 
abused by the political practices of the central govern-
ment of the monarchy. Later, based on that and not a 
“Spanish” agenda, it sought to build its own political and 
institutional framework which, once the self-governance 
lost in 1652 was won back, would be capable of giving an 
outlet to the energies and dynamism of an expanding 
economy, as Catalonia’s was in the late 17th and early 
18th centuries.70
Yet again, in around 1705, the violence of war aroused 
“national”-style tensions on an extraordinary basis. The 
continuation of the war for almost nine years and the 
practice of Bourbon “military terrorism” as a strategy to 
subjugate the peoples once again exacerbated the issue of 
differing identities.71 The final stage in the war was par-
ticularly fierce, and the propaganda workshops once 
again fostered and aired the feelings of hatred and separa-
tion between the natives and the foreign aggressors.72
However, while anti-France sentiments predominated 
in 1705-1706, the war mainly took on an anti-Castilian 
bent in 1712-1714. The emotional and identity-based 
abyss opened by the violence of war was now coupled 
with a conscious “national” feeling that was fairly wide-
spread in society, based on a reluctance to see the local 
institutions and “freedoms” destroyed to be replaced by 
alien forms of government led by the ministers from the 
Castilian court.73 The sum and intertwining of these two 
factors is surely the key to understanding the widespread, 
steadfast popular support for the heroic struggle of 1713-
1714.
The Onze de Setembre (11th of September 1714) defeat 
would lead to the establishment of an absolutist political 
model in Catalonia, which contrasted with the pactist na-
ture of its own historical tradition. This model reflected 
the political hallmark of the Bourbon dynasty, but it was 
also the outcome of ideals that sought to politically and 
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legally construct a Spanish “union” or nation based on the 
Castilian model, one which brooked no alternative pow-
ers or loyalties.
However, even after the repression of the War of the 
Spanish Succession and the constant military subjugation 
of the land, one could still detect unequivocal signs of a 
persistent Catalan national identity throughout the 18th 
and early 19th century.74 In short, our analysis of the case 
of Catalonia in relation to the construction of the modern 
Spanish state demonstrates that, in addition to the cul-
tural, symbolic and economic-tax factors, the very actions 
aimed at constructing more unified states that embodied 
hegemonic designs such as Castile’s plan for Spain, often 
generated strong identity-based reactions by the other 
communities included within the same political domain, 
primarily because of the armed conflicts they unleashed. 
All of these factors together consolidated the shaping of a 
national identity in some of these communities, such as 
Catalonia, which would last even after they were dispos-
sessed by the force of their institutional and legislative 
structures with mediaeval origins.
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